University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 26
Number 3 Summer 1996

Article 13

1996

Recent Developments: Romm v. Flax: Court of
Appeals Rejects Literal Definition of "Void" as It
Appears in the Context of the Real Property Article
Nicole M. Zell

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Zell, Nicole M. (1996) "Recent Developments: Romm v. Flax: Court of Appeals Rejects Literal Definition of "Void" as It Appears in
the Context of the Real Property Article," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 26 : No. 3 , Article 13.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol26/iss3/13

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Romm v. Flax:
COURT OF APPEALS
REJECTS LITERAL
DEFINITION OF
"VOID" AS IT
APPEARS IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE
REAL PROPERTY
ARTICLE.

In Romm v. Flax, 340
Md. 690, 668 A.2d 1 (1995),
the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the term "void,"
as it appears in the context of
section 10-702(g)( 1) ofthe Real
Property Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, means
"voidable at the option of the
purchaser," instead of its literal
definition, "of no legal force or
effect." In so holding, the court
prevented sellers from
benefitting from their failure to
supply purchasers with a disclosure or disclaimer statement
as required under the Real Property Article.
On.February 19, 1994,
Lawrence and Elaine Flax
("sellers") signed a contract to
sell their house to Barry and
Marcy Romm ("purchasers").
The contract included an addendum designated "Notice of
Purchaser's Right to Property
Condition Disclosure Statement
or Disclaimer Statement" which
established, as required by section 10-702 ofthe Real Property Article, that the purchasers
were entitled to receive a written residential property condition disclosure statement or a
written residential property disclaimer statement from the sellers. The addendum further stated, also in accord with the code
section, that if the sellers delivered the disclosure or disclaimer statement more than three
days after entry into a contract
of sale with the purchasers, then
the contract would be "void."
At the time the contract of sale
was signed, the sellers did not
furnish, nor did the purchasers
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request, the required disclaimer or disclosure statement.
Subsequent to the contract's execution, the sellers refused the purchasers' requestto
inspect the property, despite the
factthat inspection was required
by the terms of the contract. On
February 24, five days after the
contract was signed, the purchasers requested in writing and
through their attorney an inspection of the property. On
March 4, in response to the purchasers' request for an inspection, the sellers' attorney responded that his clients' failure
to provide a disclosure or disclaimer statement rendered the
contract void.
The purchasers filed a
complaint and motion for summary judgment in the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County
on March 17, 1994. In their
complaint, the buyers sought
specific performance ofthe contract and money damages. On
December 12, 1994 , circuit
court Judge Durke G. Thompson denied the purchasers' motion for summary judgment but
granted the sellers' motion for
summary judgment, holding
that their failure to provide a
disclosure or disclaimer statement as required under the contract rendered the contract void.
The purchasers appealed to the
Court of Special Appeals of
Mary land, but before the court
ofspecial appeals heard the case,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari.
The court began its analysis by noting that carrying out
the legislative intent of a statute
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is "the cardinal rule" in statutory construction. Flax, 340 Md.
at 693, 668 A.2d at 2 (1995)
(quoting Tucker v. Fireman's
Fund Insurance Co., 308 Md.
69, 73, 517 A.2d 730 (1986)).
Further, the court explained that
a dictionary is the starting point,
but not necessarily the ending
point, of interpreting controversiallanguage in a statute. Id.
(citing Morris v. Prince
George's County, 319 Md. 597,
606, 573 A.2d 1346 (1990)).
Expressing its desire to avoid
results which are '"illogical,'''
"'unreasonable,'" or "'inconsistent with common sense,'"
the court explained that it appraises not onl y the usual meaning of ambiguous terms, but
also the goals of the statute in
question. Id. (quoting Tucker,
308 Md. at 75, 517 A.2d at
732.
Applying this rationale,
the court next turned to section
10-702 ofthe Real Property Article of the Maryland Code.
Flax, 340 at 694,668 A.2d at 3.
The code states, in pertinent
part, that "[i]f the disclosure
statement is deli vered later than
three days after the vendor enters into a contract of sale with
the purchaser, the contract is
void." /d. (citing Md. Code
Ann., Real Prop. section 10702(g)(1) (1974, 1988 Repl.
Vol., 1994 Supp.)). Inorderto
ascertain the General Assembly's intent when enacting section 10-702(g)( 1), the court
looked to the legislative history
of the section, located in Chapter 640 of the Acts of 1993. The
court concluded that the stat-
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ute's intended purposes included "[r]equiring a vendor of certain real property to deliver to a
purchaser a certain disclosure
statement or disclaimer statement," and "[p ]roviding that a
purchaser has a right to rescind
a contract of sale of real property under certain circumstances." Id. at 694-95,668 A.2d at
3.

Seeking to avoid a result inconsistent with legislative intent, the court explained
that if the term "void" was given its literal definition, then sellers ofreal property would "benefit from their failure to comply
with the law," which requires
them to provide disclosure or
disclaimer statements to huyers. /d. at 695, 668 A.2d at 3.
This rationale was in accord
with an opinion of the Attorney
General which expressed that
"it is hard to see why a law
intended to aid buyers would
victimize the unwary buyer[s]
by giving a seller who entered a
contract without delivering a
statement the great advantage
of three risk-free days to look
around for a better offer." /d.
(quoting 79 Op.Att'y Gen. _,6
n. 5 (March 11, 1994)). Thus,
contrary to the sellers' position,
the court found no evidence of
legislative authority in support
of granting sellers a right of
rescission in this situation. Flax,
340 Md. at 695,668 A.2d at 3.
The court of appeals
further explained that interpreting "void" to mean "null and
void" in the context of section
10-702 would convert real estate contracts signed before the

required disclosure or disclaimer statements are delivered into
"option contracts exercisable by
the sellers only." Id. The court
noted that the term "void" in
contracts rarely means "of no
legal force or effect," but instead evidences that one party's
duty is conditioned upon the
other party's performance. Id.
at 696, 668 A.2d at 3 (quoting
Corbin on Contracts section
761 at517-18(1960)). Accordingly, the purpose of such a
contract provision is "to limit
the duty of the purchaser" and
not "to give a loophole of escape ... to the seller." Id. at 696,
668 A.2dat4. Finally, the court
explained that it had previously
rejected the literal meaning of
"void" when holding otherwise
would alter the principles of
justice and equity by allowing
one party to thwart contract
enforcement by preventing a
condition precedent. Id. (citing
Brewer v. Sowers, 118 Md. 681,
86 A. 228 (1912)).
In Romm v. Flax, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland
held that the term "void," as it
appears in section 10-702 ofthe
Real Property Article of the
Annotated Code of Maryland,
is not to be interpreted literally.
Doing so would alter the common law and contradict legislative intent by creating a new
class of option contracts exercisable only by sellers who
refuse to comply with the law.
Instead, "void" carries the contractual meaning, "voidable at
the option of the buyer." This
decision protects an unwary
buyer from a seller who, before

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
this decision, could deliberately forego his or her obligations
under the code and in return,
receive a three day "grace period" in which to search for better

offers after entering a contract
of sale. Perhaps more significantly, the court wisely preservedthe goals which the General Assembly intended this stat-

ute to accomplish when enacting it as part of Maryland law.
- Nicole M. Zell
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BEL AIR COURTHOUSE 1858
This imposing, Italiante style brick building is the architectural centerpiece of Bel Air,
Maryland, and home of the first Harford County court. Featuring a formally appointed secondfloor courtroom, the courthouse was built to replace the original 1791 Georgian style
courthouse which was destroyed by fire. Two story wings, added to house offices in 1830's,
survived the fire. Expanded in 1904, the courthouse continues as the anchor of local
government.
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